Citation :
Hamas might have miscalculated in Gaza
When he rose to power in 2017, Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, was a popular figure among both Palestinians and, more specifically, supporters of Hamas.
Contrary to other Hamas leaders, who cosied up in luxury outside of Gaza or even inside, Sinwar was untouched by the rumours of corruption that have been levelled at some leaders of the group. He had just come out of 22 years in prison, and he came back to Gaza as part of the deal to release Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Days after entering Gaza, he pledged to free all Palestinian prisoners.
Although he was widely viewed as a hardliner, some in Israel argued that Sinwar was, in fact, a pragmatist. In 2006, he was part of a group of Palestinian prisoners from various factions who signed a document effectively agreeing that a Palestinian state should coexist with an Israeli one and stating that the “resistance” to Israel’s occupation should focus on “the occupied territories of 1967” i.e. the occupied West Bank and Gaza.
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And yet, on 7 October, under Sinwar’s watch and likely at his behest, Hamas launched its "Al-Aqsa Flood" attack in Israel — the scope of which is still being understood. According to the same document he signed in 2006, these attacks targeted communities that were not within the scope of the “resistance”.
Thousands of members of Hamas’s elite commando unit al-Nukhba spent up to ten hours in Israeli border communities and at a nearby music festival, killing 1,400 Israelis — mostly civilians. The attack has raised many questions about how Israel's security services and military have failed to nip it in the bud.
This was not an accident: Hamas forces could have pushed deeper inside Israel, aiming to capture more military outposts, but chose to stay inside civilian communities to look for and execute civilians.
Sinwar is likely one of two leaders who planned the “A-Aqsa Flood” operation — as Hamas branded it. On 7 October, another Hamas commander announced the operation: Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigade.
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Were other Hamas leaders aware of this "grand plan"? Probably not. Looking at internal dynamics within Hamas, there has always been a divide between leaders "in exile" in Qatar, Lebanon, Egypt or Turkey and the ones living in Gaza. Leaders in Gaza have typically looked at those in exile either with suspicion or contempt, or both.
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This means that, most likely, the decision to launch the 7 October attacks was taken in Gaza and solely in Gaza. This is a critical point to understand because while keeping the operation secret has obvious advantages, it also has several significant consequences.
The first is that it exposes Hamas to severe miscalculation. To be clear, I am not talking about Hamas's claim that it did not intend to kill civilians — it did. But by keeping decision-making inside Gaza, Hamas leaders may have misjudged the reaction of the outside world.
This includes Israel: Leaders in Gaza likely thought that Israel, a country that had since the beginning of this year been embroiled in the worst political crisis in decades, would be paralysed and confused.
In a sense, this bet was partially correct. There are clear signs of division and confusion at the very top of the Israeli state. Trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is at the lowest it has ever been, and for good reason. But the divisions among Israelis on 6 October have since largely disappeared.
Israel is readying itself for a long war that could take months, if not years. This goes against Israel's long history of waging short wars. Hamas may have bet that 7 October would lead to an immediate invasion of Gaza by an unprepared Israeli force. This would have compounded Israel's initial 7 October failure with piles of new military casualties.
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The second miscalculation came from Hamas's expectation that the "Axis of Resistance" would fully join Deif's "grand plan to end the occupation". This assumes that Iran is genuinely interested in the Palestinian cause rather than using it for its own interests.
What the Ayatollahs in Iran are interested in is their own survival. While their rhetoric about Palestine certainly means they cannot stand on the sidelines of such an era-defining conflict, they will also act in a way that makes sure they are not the return address for any regional escalation.
Iran is generally happy to let its proxies (Iraqis, Yemenis, Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis) do the dying and take the risks.
Washington's dramatic reaction and the massive deployment of US military assets across the region may also have been something Hamas did not expect.
This explains why, despite Hamas's likely hopes, Iran has not engaged itself and its proxies — particularly Hezbollah — in a full-scale war against Israel. If the Hamas leaders in Gaza had been able to test the waters with Iran and Hezbollah ahead of time, they might have had a better idea of what to expect from their Iranian allies.
This gives us a better idea of what Hamas expected would happen. Hamas thought the unprecedented massacre of civilians, which it filmed with go-pros, would lead to a short and disastrous Israeli military campaign in Gaza.
Hamas was prepared to face such an attack and could even win, particularly if the opening of a second front tied down Israel. This would, in turn, have put Hamas in a position to negotiate the kind of deal Sinwar has always been aiming for since he was elected.
Since 2017, Sinwar has been acutely aware of one thing: Hamas as a "government" has been a great burden on Hamas as a militant/insurgent group. Taking responsibility for more than two million Palestinians is difficult.
Since 2017, Sinwar has been acutely aware of one thing: Hamas as a "government" has been a great burden on Hamas as a militant/insurgent group. Taking responsibility for more than two million Palestinians is difficult.
The Israeli blockade on Gaza means the Palestinian enclave barely survives. Though many rightfully blame Israel, Hamas is still the de facto government. Some of the popular frustration is bound to be directed at it.
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As Musa Abu Marzouk, one of Hamas's leaders, said on October 30, protecting Palestinian civilians is not Hamas's job, but it's the responsibility of the United Nations. This is not a cynical expression of disregard for Palestinian life — at least not in Hamas's mind - but the expression of their core belief that the "resistance" must be placed above all other considerations.
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The other option Sinwar has been exploring is a "Hudnah" - an Arabic term for a binding long-term truce in Gaza. As part of this Hudnah, Sinwar has been making several key demands, namely the development of several infrastructural projects to better the lives of Gazans, including new water treatment and energy facilities and even a seaport for Gaza.
This would ease the burden of governing Gaza, neutralising it as a theatre of war and enabling Hamas to focus on other endeavours — namely, undermining the Palestinian Authority.
Perhaps more importantly for Sinwar, any 'hudnah' would have to involve the release of a significant number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons. In his speeches, Sinwar often mentioned the number 1,111: This is a reference to the repeated demand by Hamas to release 1,111 prisoners in exchange for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and two Israeli civilians held in Gaza.
Even after the 7 October attacks, Sinwar released a statement indicating the group was willing to exchange all Israeli hostages against all Palestinian prisoners.
The prisoner issue is very personal for Sinwar, himself a former prisoner. But there is more to this: By freeing prisoners, Hamas hopes to position itself as the sole representative of Palestinians.
A 'hudnah' that would include the release of thousands of prisoners would position Hamas as the most popular Palestinian faction for years to come. Sinwar himself would emerge as the most successful Palestinian figure since Arafat, brushing aside his rivals both outside of Hamas and within the group.
This would be a particularly dramatic come-back, given that Sinwar's popularity has largely faded. Despite new tricks, Sinwar has not been able to deliver. In 2018, a year after being picked as Hamas's new Gaza chief, Sinwar engaged in a new strategy to try and pressure Israel: The March of Return.
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In 2021, Hamas launched the "al-Aqsa Sword" Operation by firing missiles at Jerusalem amidst great tensions in Jerusalem surrounding the eviction of Palestinians in the city and after President Abbas dashed the group's hope that elections would be held in the West Bank. This also failed to achieve any tangible results.
The same year, Sinwar was barely re-elected as Hamas's Gaza chief in secret internal elections. The elections were too close for comfort: It took four rounds of votes for Sinwar to be picked despite only being challenged by Nizar Awadullah, a relatively unknown Hamas figure.
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Documents found on Hamas commandos who carried out the 7 October attacks suggest official military planning started in 2022. Some reports and statements indicate the idea for the attack emerged a year prior. In 2021, after the elections, Sinwar must have felt that changes needed to be made, and the decision to launch the "Al-Aqsa Flood" likely emerged at that time.
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