Deux avions de chasse F-16, l'un grec et l'autre turc, se sont heurtés en "jouant au chat et à la souris" au-dessus de la mer Egée. Le pilote de l'appareil grec a été tué dans cette collision. Les versions grecque et turque de l'incident diffèrent.  
 
L'incident s'est produit dans une zone faisant l'objet d'un contentieux. Ankara affirme que l'accident a été provoqué par un appareil grec qui s'est immiscé dans des manoeuvres dans l'espace aérien international. Athènes pour sa part assure que la collision s'est produite lors de "manoeuvres d'interception" d'un appareil turc dans le ciel de l'île grecque de Karpathos, proche de Rhodes.

Many of my colleagues pilots are curious what F35 means in terms of sheer performance; how fast, how high, how far? Performance has also been diligently debated in both newspapers and Internet forums. In this post, I therefore intend to look at how both "stealth" and performance could affect the outcome of a dogfight. I hope you understand that I can not share the "juicy details" but I do not think it is necessary to get your message across.
Modern Air Combat bears little resemblance to fly sequences many know from the film Top Gun. In Top Gun we see "melee" in the air; planes chasing each other with only a few tens of meters. When we exercise similar setup between two F-16, the goal is often to kill your opponent using only aircraft cannon. Usually starting setups between 1,000 and 3,000 feet apart. Within distance has shrunk to 500 meters tend struggle to be settled, without the help of missiles. Top Gun looks great, but it does not describe modern air combat. Training with cannon is not irrelevant, but modern air combat is often decided before the pilots can see each other with their own eyes. Modern missiles have long range and is very maneuverable. They also have reliable sensors and deadly warheads. When we consciously limit ourselves to only use the cannon, it takes a lot for not a missile shot has ruled the fight long before there is talk about the "dogfight".
Top Gun looks great, but it does not describe modern air combat.
Air Combat is a merciless arena. The outcome is influenced by many factors, including weather conditions, aircraft maneuverability, range, speed, sensors, antidotes, weapons systems, visual and electromagnetic signature, the pilot's knowledge, training level and will. I mean it is not possible to point to one single factor as the most important. The whole is composed. One weak area does not necessarily mean that the aircraft is badly in dogfight, but the characteristics must be balanced.
The most maneuverable plane has the advantage if it comes to "dogfight". If I can "point" own plane in the direction of the opponent, I can simultaneously follow him with their own sensors and threaten all weapons. Yet it is not always so that the most maneuverable aircraft winner. Modern sensors and missiles changes the balance in a dogfight. Our old F-16 is quite heavy in the butt when they are dressed up with all the necessary role equipment: External Fuel, målbelysningsutstyr, weapon mounts, weapons and equipment for electronic countermeasures. There is little left of maneuverability as the audience will watch a air display.
Norwegian F-16 with all necessary equipment lose unfortunately much of the performance.  
F-16 must sacrifice a lot of performance to carry the necessary equipment. F-35 can carry a lot of this interior.
In return, our F-16 equipped with a helmet sight and highly maneuverable heat-seeking missile. Therefore, it is not as critical that our F-16 is not particularly maneuverable in armaments; our missiles are more maneuverable than any other fighter. Helmet Indicted means we do not need to point the nose of the plane in the direction of the opponent - we can "throw" a shot over the shoulder. Shot can hardly escape ...
It is an advantage to have the fastest fighter. Superior speed makes it possible to collect or escape an opponent. All javelin throwers user misses to throw as far as possible. Likewise, it is advantageous to fly high and fast when a missile being shot. The missile gets more energy which in turn increases the range so that the missile can be fired by the longer distance. If we assume equally proficient pilots, equally good sensors and equally good missiles, it seems that raw performance alone can determine the outcome of a dogfight - the fastest flying can shoot first. Whoever shoots first wins often.
Pierre Spey and other critics have pointed out that the F-35 is not as fast or maneuverable as modern Russian fighter. In a previous section I argued that the performance of the F-16 at air display is theoretical and not available in a war situation. Combat aircraft like the F-16 carries the load out. This reduces the practical range, speed, maneuverability and maximum altitude. (This also applies to your opponent's aircraft, which carries the load out).
 
With the F-35, we get more of all this, compared to what we are used to today. To discover how much more was a positive surprise for me. In full war equipment operates F-35 effortlessly 10,000 to 15,000 feet higher than our F-16 can, without using afterburner. The speed in 'cruises' is without further 50 to 80 knots higher. In the F-16, I must use afterburner and take running speed before a missile shot. F-35 "cruiser" both faster and higher. Therefore, I am ready to shoot far anytime.
In full war equipment operates F-35 effortlessly 10,000 to 15,000 feet higher than our F-16 fails
F-35 also has more fuel than we are accustomed to, it carries the load inside and is not as dependent on afterburner. Therefore we are left with more range than the F-16 and similar aircraft can achieve. "Combat radius" for the F-35 is between 30% and 70% longer than we get with the F-16! The extra range comes in handy in our elongated country. Range may alternatively be replaced in endurance over a given area. This is useful for our little organization, which disposes tanker and relies on versatility in all aspects.
Back to performance; perhaps it is the fastest flying can shoot first? In this case, I take even one important proviso; both planes must discover each other at the same distance if kinematics alone shall be conclusive. My experience shows that this is not very realistic. In daily training between their F-16 and meet with our allies, we experience in practice what radar signature and electronic antidotes means. Our old F-16 is "slim" on radar and are detected late, compared to other modern fighter aircraft. We also notice the effect of external load; the heaviest loaded planes are detected at the furthest distance because the external load increases radar signature. I therefore claim that it is unrealistic to assume that two militant fighter discovers each other simultaneously, although the sensors basically are equally good. The effect of radar signature and electronic antidotes are great. The effect of radar signature and electronic antidotes are great.
If an opponent with "old-fashioned" radar signature meets an aircraft as the F-35, with very small radar signature, it becomes difficult to exploit the benefits that provides superior performance. Imagine a meeting between a highly trained sprinter and a sniper. The mission is to shoot counterpart. Both are armed with hunting rifles, but only marksmen have riflescope. Sprinter has to return a more powerful rifle, but he is dressed in neon colored tracksuit, and takes up on the short end of a football field. Marksman is camouflaged somewhere on the opposite end path. Sprinter is the fastest and the most powerful rifle, but what is he shooting at? While sprinter gallops across the track in search of his opponent, he must take shot after shot. This is not a smooth match. Unfortunately I have found that it is extremely frustrating to train dogfight when we can not find the opponent with its own sensors. It ends rarely good.
If you can not find your opponent can not shoot at him - and then you have little use of maneuverability.  
 
The outcome of a dogfight between two identical fighter decided finally by the individual pilot. It requires time and significant resources to cultivate a skilled pilot. Especially important is perhaps a steady supply of flying time, a good and constructive learning environment, access to appropriate airspace and an organization that facilitates training. During exercises have my colleagues in the Air Force and I many times flown against more modern fighter than our F-16. Yet, "wins" we occasionally air war against more advanced adversaries, technically speaking. Often the explanation is that we meet inexperienced pilots. More interesting is perhaps when we meet pilots with completely different culture for learning and collaboration. My impression is that cultures where the distance from the conductor to lead is large, fail to cultivate equally skilled pilots. In such highly hierarchical organizations it is perhaps impossible to be honest with your boss in "debriefing" after the flight. Therefore they miss out on important learning.
My point with this post was to show that many variables affect the outcome of the dogfight. The situation is rarely black and white. One of the most diffuse might skill of the individual pilot. I am often surprised when I read cocksure posts in newspapers and comment fields. Common to many such posts is a "digital" interpretation of performance data. A speed XY, B rate YY = A is best, period. One problem is the source data referenced. Another is that it tends to focus on a few isolated parameters. Our experience with the F-35 so far has shown us a fighter that will surprise many in air-to-air role. The combination of high performance, good sensors and low signature makes the F-35 to a dangerous opponent in air campaign. Finally; remember that even Arnold Schwarzenegger had to resort to lavsignatur in the old classic "Predator." When using mud. Brute strength is good, but camouflage also works ...

Pierre Spey and other critics have pointed out that the F-35 is not as fast or maneuverable as modern Russian fighter

Eurofighter Typhoon
 
While Typhoon is cimparably expensive to operate, it is still less so than many other modern fighters. It is also easier to maintain than most twin engined fighters, except for Rafale, and can provide adequate number of training sorties. However, its high unit price means that it is lacking when it comes to providing aerial presence, and it has less than ideal road basing capability.
 
While it has adequate passive sensors suite and cockpit visibility, active missile warning system might alert the opponent on short range (assuming that enemy’s RWR is capable of detecting very short wavelengths used by the MAWS). It does have adequate cruise speed of Mach 1,5, but its two EJ200 engines consume 9.054,64 kg per hour at maximum dry thrust. This means that it consumes half of its internal fuel load within 16,4 minutes of supersonic cruise, allowing it to cover 417,6 km. Cruising at lower supersonic speed can extend endurance, but it will reduce distance covered.
 
In dogfight, it is handicapped by its comparably large size and inferior transient performance, particularly sluggish roll response. It does have very good instantaneous and sustained turn rates and acceleration, but it is still primarly a (bomber) interceptor while Gripen and Rafale are dogfighters. Its missile and gun armament is well suited for both visual range and beyond visual range combat.
 
Dassault Rafale
 
Rafale is also comparably expensive to buy and operate, but less so than Typhoon. It is also easier to maintain than any Western twin-engined fighters. It can provide adequate number of training sorties. As with Typhoon, however, it is expensive, and does not have very good road basing capability.
 
It has excellent situational awareness, including completely passive missile warning system and good cruise speed of Mach 1,4. However, its two M88-2 engines consume 7.762,56 kg per hour at maximum dry thrust, consuming half of Rafale’s internal fuel load within 18,24 minutes of supersonic cruise, allowing it to cover 464,4 km.
 
In dogfight, it has excellent transient performance thanks to its close coupled canard configuration. Its instantaneous turn rate is excellent, and it has very good sustained turn rate and acceleration. Its missile and gun armament is well suited for both visual range and beyond visual range combat, and gun in particular has comparably heavy firepower.
 
Saab Gripen
 
Saab Gripen is the cheapest of Western fighters in both acquisition and operating costs. While it has very small visual and IR signatures, its situational awareness is lacking due to the inadeqate rearward visibility and lack of IRST. It also has comparably slow cruise speed of Mach 1,05. Its RM-12 engine consumes 6.929,24 kg/h at maximum dry thrust, thus consuming half of Gripen’s fuel load within 10,39 minutes and allowing it to cover 188,9 km. It also has road basing capability.
 
In dogfight, it has good transient performance due to its close-coupled canard configuration. It also has excellent instantaneous turn rate, albeit sustained turn rate and acceleration are markedly inferior to other two Eurocanards. As with Typhoon and Rafale, its missile and gun armament is well suited for both visual range and beyond visual range combat, though it is limited in latter by lack of IRST.
 
F-22
 
Just as Gripen is the cheapest, F-22 is the most expensive of Western fighters. It has very large visual and IR signatures, and lacking situational awareness due to inadequate rearward visibility and lack of IRST. This is somewhat compensated for by its high cruise speed of Mach 1,72. However, its two F119 engines consume 17.055,2 kg/h at maximum dry thrust, thus consuming half of the F-22s fuel load within 14,42 minutes and allowing it to cover 451,06 km.
 
In dogfight it has very good acceleration and pitch onset rates, but roll onset and instantaneous turn rates are not as good as those of Rafale and Gripen. Its sustained rate should also be good. Its armament is unsuitable for both dogfight or BVR engagement, though a limited number of hardpoints present on wings might mitigate the dogfight performance problems somewhat.
 
F-35
 
F-35 is very easy to detect visually or with IRST, as it is large, has massive IR signature and is incapable of supercruise. Unlike F-22, it does have IRST, but its rearward visibility is even worse, and IRST itself is optimized for detection of ground targets. Its cruise speed of Mach 0,95 is slower than any other modern Western fighter. Fuel consumption of 11.252,2 kg of fuel at dry thrust allow it to maintain that speed for 22,08 minutes while spending half of its internal fuel. This allows it to cover 381 km.
 
In dogfight, it has sluggish acceleration, likely average pitch and roll onset rates, and inadequate instantaneous and sustained turn rates. Its armament is unsuitable for both dogfight or BVR engagement.
 
HAL Tejas
 
Tejas is a relatively small aircraft, with consequently small visual and IR signatures. It is not capable of supercruise, has bad rearward visibility and has no IRST. Fuel consumption of 6.503 kg/h at dry thrust allows it to maintain maximum cruise speed for 11,34 minutes while spending half of its internal fuel.
 
In dogfight, its low wing loading will provide it with high instantaneous turn rate. Roll rate and roll onset rate should be adequate, though not world beating. Acceleration is good. Its armament should be adequate for dogfight, though not for BVR engagement.
 
JF-17
 
Like Tejas, JF-17 is a comparably small aircraft incapable of supercruise with poor situational awareness. It should have average turning and adequate transient performance. Armament is adequate for visual range engagements only.
 
J-10
 
J-10 provides adequate force presence and road basing capability. It has good cockpit visibility, but lack of IRST harms its ability to achieve surprise, and its active missile warning system may warn the opponent of J-10s presence at short range.
 
Its maneuvering performance is good thanks to adequate wing loading and thrust-to-weight ratio, relatively low wing span and close coupled canards. Transient performance in particular should be better than most other fighters compared here (with exceptions of Gripen and Rafale). Acceleration is also good. Armament is adequate for visual range engagements.
 
J-11
 
J-11 should have dirt strip capability. Its cockpit visibility is lacking, but it does have IRST and passive MAWS. Large size does harm its ability to surprise the opponent. It should also have adequate maneuvering performance with exception of roll onset rate. Armament is adequate for visual range engagements.
 
Su-30
 
Su-30 is comparably expensive to buy and operate, limiting its force presence and ability to provide adequate number of training sorties. Latter is actually impossible to achieve due to high maintenance downtime. It does have good on-ground survivability.
 
Large visual and IR signatures harm its ability to surprise the enemy, while its own ability to detect surprise bounces is limited due to inadequate rearward visibility.
 
While it may be capable of achieving adequate transient performance, it can only do so at high cost in energy. This problem is somewhat mitigated by good acceleration and high fuel fraction. Armament is adequate for both visual range and beyond visual range combat.
 
Su-35
 
Su-35 is comparably expensive to buy and operate, limiting its force presence and ability to provide adequate number of training sorties. Latter is actually impossible to achieve due to high maintenance downtime. It does have good on-ground survivability.
 
Large visual and IR signatures harm its ability to surprise the enemy, while its own ability to detect surprise bounces is limited due to inadequate rearward visibility.
 
While it may be capable of achieving adequate transient performance, it can only do so at high cost in energy. This problem is somewhat mitigated by adequate acceleration and high fuel fraction. Armament is adequate for both visual range and beyond visual range combat.

F-22
 
Just as Gripen is the cheapest, F-22 is the most expensive of Western fighters. It has very large visual and IR signatures, and lacking situational awareness due to inadequate rearward visibility and lack of IRST. This is somewhat compensated for by its high cruise speed of Mach 1,72. However, its two F119 engines consume 17.055,2 kg/h at maximum dry thrust, thus consuming half of the F-22s fuel load within 14,42 minutes and allowing it to cover 451,06 km.
 
In dogfight it has very good acceleration and pitch onset rates, but roll onset and instantaneous turn rates are not as good as those of Rafale and Gripen. Its sustained rate should also be good. Its armament is unsuitable for both dogfight or BVR engagement, though a limited number of hardpoints present on wings might mitigate the dogfight performance problems somewhat.