U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Monday reassured the Chinese government that its huge holdings of dollar assets are safe and reaffirmed his faith in a strong U.S. currency.
 
...
 
"Chinese assets are very safe," Geithner said in response to a question after a speech at Peking University, where he studied Chinese as a student in the 1980s.
 
His answer drew loud laughter from his student audience, reflecting scepticism in China about the wisdom of a developing country accumulating a vast stockpile of foreign reserves instead of spending the money to raise living standards at home.

La Lettonie vend pour près de 4 millions d'euros de dette après un échec retentissant
 
Le Trésor de la Lettonie a annoncé jeudi avoir placé une émission d'obligations à échéance d'un mois pour 2,75 millions de lats (3,86 millions d'euros) au lendemain de l'échec d'un placement qui a suscité de vives inquiétudes sur les marchés.
Le Trésor plaçait jeudi l'émission de 50 millions de lats répartis en différentes échéances qu'il n'était pas parvenu à vendre mercredi aux investisseurs. Il a finalement trouvé acheteur pour une partie de la dette à échéance d'un mois auprès de l'unique participant à la vente.
"Je pense que le fait qu'il n'y ait eu qu'une seule offre a une importance symbolique", a commenté un analyste de Danske Bank, Lars Christensen. "Il n'y a concrètement pas de différence avec ce qui s'est passé hier", a-t-il dit à l'AFP.
L'échec de mercredi et l'échec relatif de jeudi ont une nouvelle fois mis en lumière les difficultés de la Lettonie à lever des fonds sur les marchés et a fait craindre une dévaluation de la monnaie nationale.
Le gouvernement de ce pays balte de 2,3 millions d'habitants a introduit des coupes budgétaires pour répondre aux conditions d'un accord de sauvetage de 7,5 milliards d'euros conclu avec le Fonds monétaire international, l'Union européenne et d'autres prêteurs.
L'économie lettonne devrait se contracter de 18% cette année, la prévision la plus sombre des 27 membres de l'Union européenne.

Hope for Belgian Kaupthing account holders  
AP Fri 05/06/2009 - 13:36  
A group of creditor banks has approved the takeover of Kaupthing Luxembourg by the bank of the British investment group Blackfish Capital. This revives hope for the Kaupthing bank customers whose money has been blocked since October.  
 
The takeover was approved by a group of 25 banks where Kaupthing Luxembourg has outstanding debts. The most important of the creditor banks is the Dutch ING Bank.
VRT The group of creditor banks first had some objections to the plans to take over the Luxembourg branches of the bankrupt Icelandic bank but finally gave the go ahead.
 
This opens the way for the takeover of the Kaupthing Luxembourg branch by the British investment group Blackfish Capital. The British investment group got the support of the Kaupthing Luxembourg administrators and Group K, the Belgian lobby group for the Belgian Kaupthing account holders.
 
A Libyan investment group was also interested but withdrew in the end.  
 
If the takeover had not been approved Kaupthing Luxembourg, like its mother company in Iceland, would have been declared bankrupt and the people with savings accounts would have lost all but the €20,000 that is guaranteed by the government.  
 
Hope for the account holders  
 
16,000 Belgians have savings in Kaupthing Luxembourg. Their bank accounts have been blocked since last October pending a solution for the Luxembourg branch of Kaupthing. It is not yet certain when the account holders will have access to their money.
The European Commission must still approve the takeover officially.

LES BANQUES ONT LA GROSSE TETE
05 juin 2009 | 07h32 dans L'EDITO DU JOUR

Quelle crise? Les banques américaines sont devenues amnésiques. Elles replongent avec autant d'ardeur dans leurs erreurs du passé...Les banques Américaines donnent des signes étonnants de rebond
On a du mal à imaginer en entendant les déclarations des dirigeants des principales banques américaines qu'elles étaient encore il y à quelques mois en train de mendier l'argent du gouvernement pour éviter le naufrage. Nous sommes en plein paradoxe. Les banques qui ont survécu semblent bénéficier d'une situation de cartel de fait qui leur permet d'engranger des profits records. Le premier trimestre était déjà exceptionnel, notamment en matière de trading, et voici que le deuxième semestre s'annonce encore meilleure, sur les activités de marchés mais également sur les activités de banques d'investissement.

Les cours des valeurs bancaires continuent à progresser
Et ce malgré des augmentations de capital massives. On a presque l'impression que la crise est déjà un lointain souvenir qui a juste été une opportunité d'éliminer la moitié de la concurrence. Du coup, on le savait déjà, les banques veulent toutes rembourser l'argent du gouvernement pour pouvoir payer à nouveau des bonus indécents mais maintenant elles ne veulent même plus se débarasser de leurs actifs toxiques!

Parce que l'appétit pour le risque est revenu. Et c'est d'ailleurs ce qui est inquiétant. Elles ne veulent plus vendre à la casse leurs actis toxiques tout simplement parce qu'il y a des investisseurs dans le marché qui sont preneurs, des investisseurs qui sont en train de se jeter à nouveau sur tout ce qui est trés risqué. On prend les mêmes et on recommence!
Tout cela a quand même un air de déjà vu. Espérons que les banques ne font pas une fois de plus et une fois de trop, les mêmes erreurs que par le passé.

'ATTENTE DES CHIFFRES DU CHOMAGE
05 juin 2009 | 07h34 dans MORNING ZAPPING

Les marchés retiennent leur souffle avant les chiffres de l'emploi américain. Ils seront déterminants pour l'évolution des marchés des prochaines semaines.LA BCE n'a pas bougé ses taux. Elle va cependant lancer un programme, limité, de rachat de 60 milliards d'obligations du Trésor. Et elle ne voit pas de reprise dans la zone Euro avant la mi 2010.

LES BANQUES AMERICAINES ne veulent plus vendre leurs actifs toxiques car elles trouvent preneurs sur le marché! L'appétit au risque est de retour.... La fête continue...

LE CHOMAGE EN FRANCE CONTINUE à progresser. Il a bondi de 9.1% au premier trimestre et le Pôle Emploi croule sous les dossiers.

CHINALCO, le géant chinois de l'aluminuim controlé par l'Etat, va probablement abandonné son offre sur Rio Tinto. Cette offre de 19 milliards de dollars était le plus gros investissement étranger chinois. Trop de pressions politiques en Australie et en Angleterre contre cet investissement....

GOLDMAN SACHS qui avait déjà prédit les 200 dollars sur le pétrole quand il valait 100 dollars (no comment...) revient à la charge en prévoyant un pétrole à 85% dollars à la fin de l'année. C'est peut être le moment de vendre le pétrole...

LES DISTRIBUTEURS AMERICAINS souffrent et cela ne s'arrange pas. Selon un indice publié par la profession, c'est encore une baisse de plus de 4% qu'enregistrent les retailers malgré des gros discounts.

BONNE JOURNEE
MAY THE FORCE BE WITH YOU

NOUS SOMMES TOUS LETTONS
05 juin 2009 | 11h07 dans CHRONIQUE DU CONTRARIAN LA TRIBUNE

Connaissez vous la Lettonie ? C’est un petit pays d’Europe du Nord, un des trois pays baltes avec la Lituanie et l’Estonie, redevenu indépendant en 1991 après l’explosion de L’URSS et membre de l’Union Européenne depuis 2004. Un pays de moins de trois millions d’habitants qui avait déjà subi en revers en 2009 : il ne faisait pas partie des 25 finalistes de l’Eurovision. Mais c’est cette semaine que la Lettonie a fait une entrée fracassante dans les actualités financières :

le gouvernement n’a pas réussi à lever sur les marchés 100 millions de dollars de dettes à court terme nécessaires à financer son déficit. Le FMI va devoir intervenir. L’Union Européenne aussi. En attendant, la devise lettone (le « lats » comme vous le saviez surement…) s’est effondrée, entraînant les autres devises des pays de l’Est et provoquant une chute des valeurs bancaires Suédoises, la Suède étant le principal bailleur de fonds de la Lettonie. So what me direz vous ? L’Islande a coulé, l’Espagne, la Gréce et le Portugal tanguent, pourquoi s’intéresser à un état microscopique comme la Lettonie ? Pour une raison simple. Au dernier trimestre de l’année, une adjudication du Trésor Américain échouera. Les Chinois n’en voudront pas, les Japonais non plus et les pays du Golfe encore moins. La FED elle ne pourra plus maintenir sa politique de fuite en avant de rachat d’obligations du Trésor ; Bernanke a commencé cette semaine à revenir à la raison, et les banques n’auront pas assez des 65 milliards de dollars qu’elles ont levées en Mai pour venir à la rescousse d’un Trésor qui les a pourtant sauvées de la faillite annoncée. Le trait est gros ? Les Etats-Unis ne sont pas la Lettonie ? Catastrophisme paillette ? Certes. Mais je ne sais plus quelle ficelle, même grosse , tirer pour que le problème de la dette des grands Etats deviennent une priorité absolue. Car les Etats sont les derniers recours. Les banques se sont tournées vers les Etats, mais vers qui les Etats pourront ils se tourner ? Le FMI peut sauver l’Islande ou la Lettonie mais il ne pourra pas secourir l’Angleterre ou les Etats-Unis. Pour paraphraser Cohn Bendit en cette veille d’élections Européennes : nous sommes tous des lettons.

The volume of employment is not determined by the marginal disutility of labour measured in terms of real wages, except in so far as the supply of labour available at a given real wage sets a maximum level to employment. The propensity to consume and the rate of new investment determine between them the volume of employment, and the volume of employment is uniquely related to a given level of real wages — not the other way round. If the propensity to consume and the rate of new investment result in a deficient effective demand, the actual level of employment will fall short of the supply of labour potentially available at the existing real wage, and the equilibrium real wage will be greater than the marginal disutility of the equilibrium level of employment.

This analysis supplies us with an explanation of the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty. For the mere existence of an insufficiency of effective demand may, and often will, bring the increase of employment to a standstill before a level of full employment has been reached. The insufficiency of effective demand will inhibit the process of production in spite of the fact that the marginal product of labour still exceeds in value the marginal disutility of employment.
 
Moreover the richer the community, the wider will tend to be the gap between its actual and its potential production; and therefore the more obvious and outrageous the defects of the economic system. For a poor community will be prone to consume by far the greater part of its output, so that a very modest measure of investment will be sufficient to provide full employment; whereas a wealthy community will have to discover much ampler opportunities for investment if the saving propensities of its wealthier members are to be compatible with the employment of its poorer members. If in a potentially wealthy community the inducement to invest is weak, then, in spite of its potential wealth, the working of the principle of effective demand will compel it to reduce its actual output, until, in spite of its potential wealth, it has become so poor that its surplus over its consumption is sufficiently diminished to correspond to the weakness of the inducement to invest.
 
But worse still. Not only is the marginal propensity to consume weaker in a wealthy community, but, owing to its accumulation of capital being already larger, the opportunities for further investment are less attractive unless the rate of interest falls at a sufficiently rapid rate; which brings us to the theory of the rate of interest and to the reasons why it does not automatically fall to the appropriate level, which will occupy Book IV.

The idea that we can safely neglect the aggregate demand function is fundamental to the Ricardian economics, which underlie what we have been taught for more than a century. Malthus, indeed, had vehemently opposed Ricardo’s doctrine that it was impossible for elective demand to be deficient; but vainly. For, since Malthus was unable to explain clearly (apart from an appeal to the facts of common observation) how and why effective demand could be deficient or excessive, he failed to furnish an alternative construction; and Ricardo conquered England as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain. Not only was his theory accepted by the city, by statesmen and by the academic world. But controversy ceased; the other point of view completely disappeared; it ceased to be discussed. The great puzzle of Effective Demand with which Malthus had wrestled vanished from economic literature. You will not find it mentioned even once in the whole works of Marshall, Edgeworth and Professor Pigou, from whose hands the classical theory has received its most mature embodiment. It could only live on furtively, below the surface, in the underworlds of Karl Marx, Silvio Gesell or Major Douglas.
 
The completeness of the Ricardian victory is something of a curiosity and a mystery. It must have been due to a complex of suitabilities in the doctrine to the environment into which it was projected. That it reached conclusions quite different from what the ordinary uninstructed person would expect, added, I suppose, to its intellectual prestige. That its teaching, translated into practice, was austere and often unpalatable, lent it virtue. That it was adapted to carry a vast and consistent logical superstructure, gave it beauty. That it could explain much social injustice and apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident in the scheme of progress, and the attempt to change such things as likely on the whole to do more harm than good, commanded it to authority. That it afforded a measure of justification to the free activities of the individual capitalist, attracted to it the support of the dominant social force behind authority.
 
But although the doctrine itself has remained unquestioned by orthodox economists up to a late date, its signal failure for purposes of scientific prediction has greatly impaired, in the course of time, the prestige of its practitioners. For professional economists, after Malthus, were apparently unmoved by the lack of correspondence between the results of their theory and the facts of observation;— a discrepancy which the ordinary man has not failed to observe, with the result of his growing unwillingness to accord to economists that measure of respect which he gives to other groups of scientists whose theoretical results are confirmed by observation when they are applied to the facts.
 
The celebrated optimism of traditional economic theory, which has led to economists being looked upon as Candides, who, having left this world for the cultivation of their gardens, teach that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds provided we will let well alone, is also to be traced, I think, to their having neglected to take account of the drag on prosperity which can be exercised by an insufficiency of effective demand. For there would obviously be a natural tendency towards the optimum employment of resources in a Society which was functioning after the manner of the classical postulates. It may well be that the classical theory represents the way in which we should like our Economy to behave. But to assume that it actually does so is to assume our difficulties away.

Any fluctuation in investment not offset by a corresponding change in the propensity to consume will, of course, result in a fluctuation in employment. Since, therefore, the volume of investment is subject to highly complex influences, it is highly improbable that all fluctuations either in investment itself or in the marginal efficiency of capital will be of a cyclical character. [...]

I can best introduce what I have to say by beginning with the later stages of the boom and the onset of the “crisis”.
 
We have seen above that the marginal efficiency of capital depends, not only on the existing abundance or scarcity of capital-goods and the current cost of production of capital-goods, but also on current expectations as to the future yield of capital-goods. In the case of durable assets it is, therefore, natural and reasonable that expectations of the future should play a dominant part in determining the scale on which new investment is deemed advisable. But, as we have seen, the basis for such expectations is very precarious. Being based on shifting and unreliable evidence, they are subject to sudden and violent changes.
 
Now, we have been accustomed in explaining the “crisis” to lay stress on the rising tendency of the rate of interest under the influence of the increased demand for money both for trade and speculative purposes. At times this factor may certainly play an aggravating and, occasionally perhaps, an initiating part. But I suggest that a more typical, and often the predominant, explanation of the crisis is, not primarily a rise in the rate of interest, but a sudden collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital.
 
The later stages of the boom are characterised by optimistic expectations as to the future yield of capital-goods sufficiently strong to offset their growing abundance and their rising costs of production and, probably, a rise in the rate of interest also. It is of the nature of organised investment markets, under the influence of purchasers largely ignorant of what they are buying and of speculators who are more concerned with forecasting the next shift of market sentiment than with a reasonable estimate of the future yield of capital-assets, that, when disillusion falls upon an over-optimistic and over-bought market, it should fall with sudden and even catastrophic force. Moreover, the dismay and uncertainty as to the future which accompanies a collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital naturally precipitates a sharp increase in liquidity-preference — and hence a rise in the rate of interest. Thus the fact that a collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital tends to be associated with a rise in the rate of interest may seriously aggravate the decline in investment. But the essence of the situation is to be found, nevertheless, in the collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital, particularly in the case of those types of capital which have been contributing most to the previous phase of heavy new investment. Liquidity-preference, except those manifestations of it which are associated with increasing trade and speculation, does not increase until after the collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital.

It is this, indeed, which renders the slump so intractable. Later on, a decline in the rate of interest will be a great aid to recovery and, probably, a necessary condition of it. But, for the moment, the collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital may be so complete that no practicable reduction in the rate of interest will be enough. If a reduction in the rate of interest was capable of proving an effective remedy by itself, it might be possible to achieve a recovery without the elapse of any considerable interval of time and by means more or less directly under the control of the monetary authority. But, in fact, this is not usually the case; and it is not so easy to revive the marginal efficiency of capital, determined, as it is, by the uncontrollable and disobedient psychology of the business world. It is the return of confidence, to speak in ordinary language, which is so insusceptible to control in an economy of individualistic capitalism. This is the aspect of the slump which bankers and business men have been right in emphasising, and which the economists who have put their faith in a “purely monetary” remedy have underestimated.

 
This brings me to my point. The explanation of the time-element in the trade cycle, of the fact that an interval of time of a particular order of magnitude must usually elapse before recovery begins, is to be sought in the influences which govern the recovery of the marginal efficiency of capital. There are reasons, given firstly by the length of life of durable assets in relation to the normal rate of growth in a given epoch, and secondly, by the carrying-costs of surplus stocks, why the duration of the downward movement should have an order of magnitude which is not fortuitous, which does not fluctuate between, say, one year this time and ten years next time, but which shows some regularity of habit between, let us say, three and five years.

The second stable time-factor is due to the carrying-costs of surplus stocks which force their absorption within a certain period, neither very short nor very long. The sudden cessation of new investment after the crisis will probably lead to an accumulation of surplus stocks of unfinished goods. The carrying-costs of these stocks will seldom be less than 10 per cent. per annum. Thus the fall in their price needs to be sufficient to bring about a restriction which provides for their absorption within a period of, say, three to five years at the outside. Now the process of absorbing the stocks represents negative investment, which is a further deterrent to employment; and, when it is over, a manifest relief will be experienced.
 
Moreover, the reduction in working capital, which is necessarily attendant on the decline in output on the downward phase, represents a further element of disinvestment, which may be large; and, once the recession has begun, this exerts a strong cumulative influence in the downward direction. In the earliest phase of a typical slump there will probably be an investment in increasing stocks which helps to offset disinvestment in working-capital; in the next phase there may be a short period of disinvestment both in stocks and in working-capital; after the lowest point has been passed there is likely to be a further disinvestment in stocks which partially offsets reinvestment in working-capital; and, finally, after the recovery is well on its way, both factors will be simultaneously favourable to investment. It is against this background that the additional and superimposed effects of fluctuations of investment in durable goods must be examined. When a decline in this type of investment has set a cyclical fluctuation in motion there will be little encouragement to a recovery in such investment until the cycle has partly run its course.
 
Unfortunately a serious fall in the marginal efficiency of capital also tends to affect adversely the propensity to consume. For it involves a severe decline in the market value of Stock Exchange equities. Now, on the class who take an active interest in their Stock Exchange investments, especially if they are employing, borrowed funds, this naturally exerts a very depressing influence. These people are, perhaps, even more influenced in their readiness to spend by rises and falls in the value of their investments than by the state of their income. With a “stock-minded” public, as in the United States to-day, a rising stock-market may be an almost essential condition of a satisfactory propensity to consume; and this circumstance, generally overlooked until lately, obviously serves to aggravate still further the depressing effect of a decline in the marginal efficiency of capital.

It may, of course, be the case — indeed it is likely to be — that the illusions of the boom cause particular types of capital-assets to be produced in such excessive abundance that some part of the output is, on any criterion, a waste of resources; — which sometimes happens, we may add, even when there is no boom. It leads, that is to say, to misdirected investment. But over and above this it is an essential characteristic of the boom that investments which will in fact yield, say, 2 per cent. in conditions of full employment are made in the expectation of a yield of, say, 6 per cent., and are valued accordingly. When the disillusion comes, this expectation is replaced by a contrary “error of pessimism”, with the result that the investments, which would in fact yield 2 per cent. in conditions of full employment, are expected to yield less than nothing; and the resulting collapse of new investment then leads to a state of unemployment in which the investments, which would have yielded 2 per cent. in conditions of full employment, in fact yield less than nothing. We reach a condition where there is a shortage of houses, but where nevertheless no one can afford to live in the houses that there are.
 
Thus the remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a lower rate of interest! For that may enable the so-called boom to last. The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.

The boom which is destined to end in a slump is caused, therefore, by the combination of a rate of interest, which in a correct state of expectation would be too high for full employment, with a misguided state of expectation which, so long as it lasts, prevents this rate of interest from being in fact deterrent. A boom is a situation in which over-optimism triumphs over a rate of interest which, in a cooler light, would be seen to be excessive.
 
Except during the war, I doubt if we have any recent experience of a boom so strong that it led to full employment. In the United States employment was very satisfactory in 1928-29 on normal standards; but I have seen no evidence of a shortage of labour, except, perhaps, in the case of a few groups of highly specialised workers. Some “bottle-necks” were reached, but output as a whole was still capable of further expansion. Nor was there over-investment in the sense that the standard and equipment of housing was so high that everyone, assuming full employment, had all he wanted at a rate which would no more than cover the replacement cost, without any allowance for interest, over the life of the house; and that transport, public services and agricultural improvement had been carried to a point where further additions could not reasonably be expected to yield even their replacement cost. Quite the contrary. It would be absurd to assert of the United States in 1929 the existence of over-investment in the strict sense. The true state of affairs was of a different character. New investment during the previous five years had been, indeed, on so enormous a scale in the aggregate that the prospective yield of further additions was, coolly considered, falling rapidly. Correct foresight would have brought down the marginal efficiency of capital to an unprecedentedly low figure; so that the “boom” could not have continued on a sound basis except with a very low long-term rate of interest, and an avoidance of misdirected investment in the particular directions which were in danger of being over-exploited. In fact, the rate of interest was high enough to deter new investment except in those particular directions which were under the influence of speculative excitement and, therefore, in special danger of being over-exploited; and a rate of interest, high enough to overcome the speculative excitement, would have checked, at the same time, every kind of reasonable new investment. Thus an increase in the rate of interest, as a remedy for the state of affairs arising out of a prolonged period of abnormally heavy new investment, belongs to the species of remedy which cures the disease by killing the patient.

Moreover, I should readily concede that the wisest course is to advance on both fronts at once. Whilst aiming at a socially controlled rate of investment with a view to a progressive decline in the marginal efficiency of capital, I should support at the same time all sorts of policies for increasing the propensity to consume. For it is unlikely that full employment can be maintained, whatever we may do about investment, with the existing propensity to consume. There is room, therefore, for both policies to operate together; — to promote investment and, at the same time, to promote consumption, not merely to the level which with the existing propensity to consume would correspond to the increased investment, but to a higher level still.