Prominent scientist ‘downplayed Covid lab leak theory to avoid upsetting China’
Private messages show Prof Andrew Rambaut helped stifle debate into virus’s origins because he feared ‘s---show’ for accusing Beijing

An influential British scientist played down the Covid lab leak theory to avoid angering China, newly released messages suggest.
 
Prof Andrew Rambaut, professor of molecular evolution at the University of Edinburgh, was one of the authors of a key paper published in Nature Medicine in March 2020.
 
The paper, The Proximal Origin of Sars-CoV-2, argued that a natural spillover event caused the pandemic and was hugely instrumental in stifling debate into the origins of the virus.
 
But private messages released by the US Oversight Committee, which is investigating the origins of Covid, show that in the weeks before publication the authors had acknowledged that a laboratory leak was a possibility but were concerned about upsetting the Chinese.

In a conversation with first author Prof Kristian Andersen, of the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California, on Feb 2 2020, Prof Rambaut wrote: “Given the s---show that would happen if anyone seriously accused the Chinese of even accidental release, my feeling is we should say there is no evidence of a specifically engineered virus, we cannot possibly distinguish between natural evolution and escape, so we are content with ascribing it to a natural process.”

Later in the exchange, Prof Rambaut admitted that a mutation in the Covid virus could have occurred in the laboratory through a process called passaging, where viruses evolve in laboratory animals or cell cultures over time.

In the messages, Prof Andersen said that the presence of a furin cleavage site, which helps the virus enter human cells, “moves me slightly more towards accidental release”. However, he said it was “well above my pay grade to call the shots on a final conclusion”.

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Chinese Foreign Ministry blasted#Japan’s export curbs on chip-manufacturing items targeted at #China, saying it has lodged stern representations with the Japanese side and will firmly safeguard China's interests. https://globaltimes.cn/page/202307/1294890.shtml

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We hope the Japanese side will consider the issue in the context of China-Japan trade cooperation and its own long-term interests, comply with international trade rules and refrain from abusing export controls to avoid disrupting normal semiconductor cooperation between the two countries: Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning

Chine : le ministre des Affaires étrangères Qin Gang révoqué

Le ministre chinois des Affaires étrangères, Qin Gang, qui n’a plus été vu en public depuis un mois, a été relevé de ses fonctions, a rapporté mardi l’agence de presse officielle Chine nouvelle. Qin Gang, en poste depuis décembre 2022, est remplacé par son prédécesseur Wang Yi, indique Chine nouvelle, sans donner de raison.

With a basic understanding of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, let's now examine Qin Gang's time in office. Qin Gang assumed the position of Chinese ambassador to the United States in July 2021, six months after Biden took office. Before him, Cui Tiankai, the ambassador during the most tense moments of US-China relations under the Trump administration, was replaced. During that time, there were instances of inconsistent statements from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Cui Tiankai suggesting that Zhao Lijian's claim that the virus originated from a US laboratory was insane.

The reason for the different voices within China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was due to political warfare between factions—Xi faction and the kleptocratic faction. During the pandemic, the "kleptocratic faction, AKA, thieves of the country," led by Wang Qishan and Zeng Qinghong, sought to use the outbreak and virus tracing to escalate tensions in US-China relations and launch a coup to remove Xi Jinping from power, thus regaining control and going back to the kleptocratic economy. Therefore, diplomats controlled by the kleptocratic leaders naturally hoped to provoke the United States with provocative language to further escalate tensions in US-China relations and achieve their political goals. However, it should be emphasized that despite Cui Tiankai's criticism of Zhao Lijian, it does not necessarily mean that Cui Tiankai was Xi Jinping's ally. Instead, he struck a balance between the two factions' struggles. What we want to emphasize is that China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was split amid the internal political warfare within the CCP.

When Qin Gang assumed office in July 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was still divided. This was because the CCP and the government had not undergone any political transition (the 20th National Congress was scheduled for November 2022), and Yang Jiechi still effectively controlled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (serving as Director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Foreign Affairs).
Being known for his " sheep diplomacy," Qin Gang's statements were calm and filled with expectations and appeals for the positive development of US-China relations. He extended goodwill to various sectors in the United States. However, this was mainly due to the adjustment of US policy towards the CCP since Biden took office, with a focus on competition while seeking cooperation in the US-China relationship. China, in response, adopted a more conciliatory approach.
Regardless of which faction Qin Gang represented, he had to speak for the official voice of the country. Therefore, based on this event, it is not sufficient to conclude that Qin Gang was on Xi’s side.

According to Guo Wengui's revelations, Qin Gang had once tried to marry Xi Jinping's daughter, even divorcing his wife for this purpose, but Xi Jinping eventually did not agree to the marriage. This sheds another light on Qin Gang's relationship with Xi Jinping. Another noteworthy point is Qin Gang's rapid rise to prominence.
He became the Foreign Minister in December 2022 after the 20th National Congress, and in March 2023, he was promoted to State Councillor. His swift ascension has amazed many, leading some to believe that he was Xi Jinping's ally. However, it should be noted that there were no significant changes in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the 20th National Congress, with Wang Yi, a previous member of the kleptocratic faction before his surrender to Xi, replacing the retiring Yang Jiechi as Director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Foreign Affairs.
This indicates that Xi is very cautious about the personnel changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the one hand, due to Yang Jiechi's long-standing efforts and influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and overseas, abruptly reshuffling the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would undoubtedly attract attention and even dissatisfaction from various sectors in the United States. Especially considering that the leaders in the kleptocratic faction have hidden a lot of assets overseas, the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the West is not just about politics but also about money. Therefore, Wang Yi's appointment as the Director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, and Qin Gang's appointment as the Foreign Minister, were the results of negotiations between Yang Jiechi's diplomatic clique and Xi Jinping before Yang's retirement, representing a compromise between the two factions.

From this perspective, although Xi consolidated his internal power after the 20th National Congress and the Two Sessions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains under Yang Jiechi's influence.

Qin Gang's sudden disappearance can be traced back to the news on July 11, 2023, when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated that Qin Gang could not attend the ASEAN meeting due to health reasons, with Wang Yi attending on his behalf. A week later, during Xi Jinping's meeting with former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Qin Gang was still absent. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson made no substantive statement on this matter. Additionally, there were many disclosures on Twitter, such as rumors about Qin Gang having an illegitimate child with Phoenix TV journalist Fu Xiaotian and claims that Fu Xiaotian is an American spy. These signs indicate that Qin Gang's disappearance is a political event rather than a health-related issue.

The question now is who took down Qin Gang, and there are two possibilities. First, Xi Jinping's faction took down Qin Gang for political reasons and launched an investigation. Second, the kleptocratic faction led by Wang Qishan took action to halt Qin Gang's conciliatory approach and return China-US relations to a state of tension, using the release of compromising material as a weapon to bring Qin Gang down. While both scenarios are possible, our assessment show that Qin Gang's downfall was due to Xi Jinping's government. The core reason is that if the kleptocratic faction led by Wang Qishan wanted to bring down Qin Gang to control the US ambassadorship to escalate tensions between China and the US, then Qin Gang must have had a close relationship with Xi Jinping, allowing him to act independently outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs system, making him an outsider to Yang Jiechi's diplomatic clique. However, this scenario is unlikely, as Qin Gang's swift ascent to prominence before Yang Jiechi's retirement and Wang Yi's appointment as the leader of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that Qin Gang was the result of a compromise between Yang Jiechi and Xi. Qin Gang cannot be Xi's man, and therefore, he would not have the ability to influence China-US relations independently.

Furthermore, two other events support this point: the visits to China by US climate envoy John Kerry and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Both of these figures are crucial in US-China relations, and their significance requires no elaboration. They have played important roles during the most tense periods of US-China relations. For example, Kissinger visited China to stabilize relations before the 2020 US election when relations were most tense, and Kerry, as the first US dignitary to visit China after Biden took office, held the role of climate envoy, a position that speaks volumes as he could visit China as an official at any time. From this layout, it can be deduced that these two important US figures' visits indicate a significant event affecting US-China relations within China. This event must be closely linked to the issue of Qin Gang's disappearance. In the news about Xi Jinping meeting with Kissinger, it was specifically mentioned that Wang Yi was present, further confirming the close connection between this matter and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://news.cn/politics/leaders/20 [...] 759460.htm Therefore, this reveals the truth about Qin Gang's downfall, which is the beginning of the reshuffling of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Yang Jiechi.

As for why Qin Gang was taken down, there are various rumors, but if many Twitter accounts are meant to release information to set the stage of the office announcement by the Chinese government later, the possibility that Qin Gang's mistress is an American spy is the most likely one. This indicates that Qin Gang did something that betrayed the government during his tenure, or in other words, he betrayed the Xi Jinping regime for the kleptocratic faction’s interests. Only such a serious act would cause a Foreign Minister to disappear instantly, with the official authorities remaining silent and US officials visiting.

What will be the consequences of Qin Gang's removal? As we stated before, we believe that Qin Gang's removal marks the beginning of a restructuring within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regardless of the reason for Qin Gang's takedown, it is a consequence of Yang Jiechi's decades-long efforts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and overseas, firmly grasping power within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, posing a significant threat to Xi. Therefore, Xi will use this opportunity to completely overhaul the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Qin Gang's removal will mark the end of the Yang Jiechi era in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Therefore, President Xi Jinping will undoubtedly use this opportunity to completely reorganize the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For Xi Jinping's regime, having recently put an end to China's three-decade-long era of "kleptocratic economy" and having obtained a significant portion of the government's authority (note: although Xi Jinping has been in power in China for over ten years, his regime truly gained control over a large portion of the nation's power after the 20th National Congress and the Two Sessions), this newly established regime has reached a critical juncture.
This regime now faces crucial questions, such as how to restart the era of China-US relations after the era of kleptocratic economy, how to overcome the economic downturn caused by the pandemic, and most importantly, how to regain the license to operate in the world economic system, especially in the West, and particularly with the United States. These are the core issues that Xi Jinping's regime must consider.

As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which primarily handles foreign relations and especially China-US relations, becomes the top priority for reformation. In our analysis, after Qin Gang's removal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be led by a new group of individuals who will build a new type of China-US relationship, which will no longer be dominated by the kleptocratic financial system. Instead, it will be focused on how China can genuinely integrate into the Western market economy, how Chinese civilization can blend with the mainstream world civilization led by the West, and how China's future political system reform can adapt to the Western market economy. Additionally, it will consider how Western capital can obtain benefits in the new Chinese market, ultimately achieving a win-win scenario.

En matière économique, l’après-Covid-19 est loin d’être ce qu’espéraient un grand nombre de Chinois. Signe du ralentissement de la croissance du pays, le PIB du pays n’a augmenté que de 0,8 % au deuxième trimestre de l’année 2023. “L’indice des prix à la consommation [instrument permettant de mesurer l’inflation] a n’a pas progressé en juin [par rapport à juin 2022], marquant un premier arrêt depuis deux ans et quatre mois. Quant aux investissements immobiliers, ils ont chuté de 7,9 % dans la première moitié de l’année par rapport à la même période de l’année 2022”, relate le quotidien japonais Asahi Shimbun.
 
Une crise immobilière, la consommation qui stagne et les entreprises qui souffrent de la chute de la demande, sans oublier le chômage élevé des jeunes : la conjoncture économique fait de plus en plus penser au Japon des années 1990. Après l’éclatement de la bulle immobilière, l’archipel, alors deuxième puissance mondiale, s’était enfoncé dans une longue crise économique, marquée notamment par la déflation, la stagnation du niveau des salaires et le déclin démographique. Pis, le pays n’en est toujours pas sorti.
 
En juin, Yin Jianfeng, professeur à l’université de commerce international et d’économie de Pékin, a publié dans le magazine Caixin un rapport intitulé “Éviter la maladie du Japon”, en faisant la comparaison entre les deux pays. “Il y a des traces suggérant que la maladie est apparue aussi chez nous”, écrit-il, cité par Asahi Shimbun.
 
De la crise de l’emploi à la crise sociale
L’économie chinoise suit-elle une trajectoire comparable à celle du Japon ? Naturellement, cette question attire l’attention des médias sur l’autre rive de la mer de l’Est. Dans une interview accordée à la chaîne de télévision TBS, Ke Long, économiste chinois installé au Japon, va même jusqu’à affirmer que la Chine est “déjà entrée en déflation”.
 
En mai, le taux de chômage des jeunes urbains âgés de 16 à 24 ans atteignait 20,8 %. “La réalité est sans doute bien plus grave” que les chiffres ne le suggèrent, indique l’économiste. Ce dernier souligne notamment que les 300 millions de travailleurs migrants chinois ne sont pas pris en compte.
 
Il redoute notamment que le phénomène n’affecte durablement la consommation du pays, un des facteurs de la déflation. “Le chômage des jeunes se transmet à la génération des 30-40 ans, les entreprises préférant éviter de garder ces personnes aux salaires plus importants. La crise d’emploi de cette génération conduit à une crise sociale, car ce sont des gens qui ont des enfants et des prêts immobiliers. Il faudrait que le gouvernement chinois trouve vite des solutions”, déclare-t-il. Pour mémoire, après l’éclatement de la bulle financière au début des années 1990, les jeunes Japonais avaient été frappés par une crise de l’emploi sans précédent, culminant vers une baisse importante du taux de natalité.
 
Si le site Business Insider se montre plus prudent sur la question d’une baisse durable des prix, il avance tout de même que la Chine est “au bord de la déflation”. “[Le pays] est à la fois un gigantesque exportateur de biens et une énorme source de revenus pour les entreprises américaines majeures comme Apple ou Nike. Le ralentissement de l’économie chinoise risque de se faire sentir à travers le monde”, avertit-il.

An unusually public claim by a Chinese professor that the country’s youth unemployment rate might have hit close to 50 per cent in March has revived a debate about official statistics and focused attention on a weak labour market.
 
The National Bureau of Statistics said that month’s jobless rate for people between the ages of 16 and 24 was 19.7 per cent, less than half of what Peking University professor Zhang Dandan estimated.
 
If 16 million non-students “lying flat” at home or relying on their parents were included, the rate could have been as high as 46.5 per cent, Prof Zhang wrote in an online article in Caixin, a respected financial magazine.

Additionally, regulations introduced since 2021 in the tutoring, property and online platform sectors have disproportionately hit young employees and the well-educated, she said.

Volkswagen AG plans to invest $700 million in Xpeng Inc. and jointly develop electric vehicles in China as the German automaker fights to halt a sales slide in its most important market.
VW will eventually hold a 4.99% stake in the Chinese company via a capital increase and is getting an observer board seat, it said Wednesday. Its Audi premium brand will deepen ties with VW’s long-term partner SAIC Motor Corp Ltd. to also bolster its EV lineup.