Grave incident dans le nord
Des hélicoptères d'évacuation sont entendus à travers le nord.
 
Évacuation aérienne vers Sheba.
 
Évacuation aérienne vers Rambam

The IDF is now releasing classified information about the hunt for Sinwar. The six hostages who were executed, including Hersh, were the ones used as a human shield by Sinwar for months.
 
 After the rescue of Farhan al-Qadi, the Hamas leader left the tunnel where the hostages were being kept. Their physical condition no longer allowed them to be moved around, and Sinwar believed his best chance was to move swiftly from place to place.  
 
Not long after, Hamas executed them when the IDF was getting close. The destruction of much of the tunnel system also meant he had to hide above ground.
 
 In sum, it is the relentless pressure from the IDF that flushed Sinwar out.

BREAKING: Hezbollah says its command has given orders to escalate the battle with Israel

Hezbollah announces new ‘escalatory phase’ in war against Israel by targeting troops with precision-guided missiles
 
Lebanon’s Hezbollah terror group says it is launching a new phase in its war against Israel, saying it has used precision-guided missiles to target troops.
 
In a statement, the Iran-backed group announces “the transition to a new and escalatory phase in the confrontation with the Israeli enemy,” adding that precision-guided missiles “are being used for the first time.”

U.N. Peacekeepers Are Hezbollah’s Best Friend
 
Unifil let the terrorists roll in Lebanon but grandstands when Israel fights back.

For 11 months Hezbollah fired more than 8,500 rockets and missiles at Israel, mostly from southern Lebanon, under Unifil’s nose. The area, militia-free by order of the U.N. Security Council, was soon crawling with the world’s best-armed terrorists. But the peacekeepers said little and did less.

 
EXCLUSIF : Une source bien informée au sein de la communauté du renseignement américain nous a fait part d'un document « top secret » extrêmement sensible du NGIA, daté des 15 et 16 octobre, détaillant les préparatifs israéliens en vue d'une frappe d'envergure à l'intérieur de l'Iran.
 
Selon ce rapport, les États-Unis ont observé l'armée de l'air israélienne manipuler des ALBM (missiles balistiques à lanceur aérien) tels que « Golden Horizon » (au moins 16) et « ROCKS » (au moins 40) sur la base aérienne d'Hatserim depuis le 8 octobre. Si tous ces missiles sont utilisés, il s'agira d'une attaque majeure.
 
Du 15 au 16 octobre, l'armée de l'air israélienne a également manipulé plusieurs ASM (missiles air-surface) sur les bases aériennes de Ramot David et de Ramon, ce qui indique une attaque imminente.
 
En outre, l'armée de l'air israélienne a effectué un exercice LFE le 15 octobre pour s'entraîner au ravitaillement en vol et aux opérations de recherche et de sauvetage au combat avec un grand nombre d'aéronefs, dont au moins trois avions-citernes KC-707, un avion Gulfstream AWACs G-550 et peut-être des avions de chasse.
 
Ce rapport classifié provient de la National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, qui fait partie du ministère américain de la défense.

Yahya Sinwar Finally Got What He Deserved
 
In 2021, Israel bombed Gaza for 11 days in a campaign known as Operation Guardian of the Walls. At the end of the battle, Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, posed for a photograph in broad daylight. Surrounded by rubble, he sat in an armchair. On his face, he wore a defiant smile.
 
Sinwar—obsessed with operational security, paranoid about Israeli collaborators in his midst—possessed a genius for survival that inflicted death on his own people. For more than a year since October 7, 2023, he eluded the Israeli Defense Forces as they flooded his tunnels, detonated the passages for his escape, and flattened plausible hiding places. Sinwar’s survival was a haunting nightmare. The prospect of the architect of October 7 posing again, with that wicked smirk, was justification for continuing the war.
 
That he will never smile again means that Israel has achieved a comprehensive military victory in Gaza, albeit at a terrible cost to civilians and to its own reputation. The Hamas hierarchy that unleashed October 7 has been eliminated. The smuggling tunnels that funneled Iranian-supplied arms from Egypt have been destroyed. The rank-and-file soldiers of the terror army have been decimated. Israel’s only remaining significant objective is the release of its hostages.
 
The question now is whether Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has enough strategic and moral sense to leverage its military wins into a plausible vision of peace. But before fretting about the future, it’s worth celebrating the fact that one of history’s monsters has met the fate that he deserved.
 
A suicide bomber destroys himself. Yahya Sinwar strapped the entirety of Gaza to his body. When he unleashed the pogrom of October 7, he did so with the full knowledge that he was provoking a shattering Israeli retaliation. Cutting the border fence and inciting a barbaric orgy of murder, rape, and kidnapping was sure to culminate in Palestinian-civilian deaths. Palestinian death was his goal, and he guaranteed it, by cowardly commingling his army among innocents. In Sinwar’s moral calculus, the more suffering the better, because it hastened the delegitimization of Israel and, in his phantasmagoric view, the arrival of a Muslim state between the river and the sea.
 
Many nations have pleaded with Israel to end this war. It’s a moral travesty that they didn’t simultaneously direct their pleas to Sinwar. At any moment, he could have attempted to spare his people. He could have surrendered and proposed exiling himself to another country; he could have handed over the hostages and accepted the Israeli terms for a cease-fire, which weren’t that far from his own.
 
That Sinwar avoided shouldering moral culpability for Palestinian death in broad swaths of Western opinion is testament to his sinister strategic sensibility. Israel possessed superior military technology. But it was Sinwar who possessed the state-of-the-art military brain. He embraced what the Russians like to call hybrid warfare. That is, he studied public perception in Israel and the West—and he calibrated his military strategy to achieve his goals. Around the time that protests erupted on American college campuses, he seemed to harden his negotiating position. U.S. intelligence officials and diplomats told me that they suspected that he didn’t want to end the war, which was advancing his long-term objective of building Western disdain for Israel.
 
(...)
 
Sinwar’s improbable survival gave the Israeli government an excuse to delay thinking about the day after, to deflect the looming questions about Gaza’s future: Who will secure the Strip? Who will govern it? But avoiding these hard questions has only made Israel’s choices worse. Despite the offers of assistance from Sunni Arab states and America, it has not even an inkling of a plan for Gaza. In the short term, the only viable alternatives are anarchy and occupation, both of which are moral catastrophes in the making. But perhaps Sinwar’s death will finally permit a moment of cathartic grief. By easing people’s pain, it could free their minds.