Selon ses sources, proches de l'enquête, il n'y aurait pas eu de problème de pollution du carburant, ni de défaillance mécanique au niveau des deux moteurs GE Aerospace GEnx-1B. De même, aucun problème de volet n'a été relevé.
Toujours au niveau technique, si des informations sur des éléments défectueux ou suspects avaient été identifiés sur les données de la boîte noire, Boeing ou GE aurait déjà émis auprès des compagnies ce qu'on appelle un message « MOM » pour « message multi-opérateurs ».
Cette absence de notification indique clairement qu'une défaillance mécanique est à exclure comme cause principale probable de l'accident. D'ailleurs, aucune recommandation n'a été émise par les organismes internationaux de sécurité. Par sécurité, seule l'inspection de la flotte de B-787 d'Air India a été réalisée et rien de suspect n'a été identifié sur les autres appareils.

The eMCO-SiPO project therefore focused on two concepts of operations:

   Extended Minimum-Crew Operations (eMCOs) where single-pilot operations are allowed during the cruise phase of the flight, nonetheless achieving a level of safety equivalent to today’s two-pilot operations. This should offer at least an equivalent overall level of safety through compensation means (e.g. ground assistance, advanced cockpit design with workload alleviation means, etc.). eMCO is, in particular, relevant to large aeroplanes operated in CAT operations, for which no fewer than two flight crew members are currently required as per the Air Operations Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 965/2012).
     
    Single-Pilot Operations (SiPOs), where, at a later stage, end-to-end single-pilot operations might be allowed, offering at least a level of safety equivalent to today’s two-pilot operations provided that compensation means are in place (e.g. ground assistance, advanced cockpit design with workload alleviation means, capability to cope with pilot incapacitation etc.).

Conclusions
With the current cockpit design taken as a reference, and within the limits of the research, it was identified that an equivalent level of safety between eMCO and the current two-crew operations cannot be sufficiently demonstrated.

Main areas for considerations are the following:

   pilot incapacitation monitoring,
    fatigue and drowsiness,
    sleep inertia,
    cross-checks, and
    physiological needs.

Development of cockpit technology and further research will be needed before exploring the feasibility of such operational concepts.

This is aligned with expectations. EASA has already made clear that changes to the cockpit will be needed to support any such new concept of operations. Its rulemaking programme will reflect this outcome, concentrating on the development, evaluation, and deployment of such advanced flight deck technologies applied in the current two-pilot operations. This is reflected in the latest edition of the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) 2025.

In the longer-term, the presence of a ‘Smart Cockpit’ with novel workload alleviation functions, with flight crew performance, alertness, and incapacitation monitoring, and with a solution to prevent security threats may have the potential to set the basis for new operational concepts. However, any consideration of this will depend on the new technologies proving their safety benefit, which will require detailed assessment on the basis of data and experience gained in normal two-pilot operations.

On Jul 11th 2025, while still waiting for the preliminary report to be released by India's AAIB/DGCA with India already on Jul 12th 2025, a reader made The Aviation Herald aware of a Service Bulletin released by General Electrics (the engine manufacturer) and the FAA: Service Bulletin FAA-2021-0273-0013 Attachment 2, which recommends the replacement of the MN4 microprocessor on ECU with respect to engine fuel and control stating: "This recommendation is to address a condition that may affect Flight Safety." The service bulletin further states: "Accumulated thermal cycles of the EEC with age causes the solder ball to fail."

On Jul 11th 2025 a reader made The Aviation Herald aware of a Service Bulletin released by General Electrics (the engine manufacturer) and the FAA: Service Bulletin FAA-2021-0273-0013 Attachment 2, which recommends the replacement of the MN4 microprocessor on ECU with respect to engine fuel and control stating: "This recommendation is to address a condition that may affect Flight Safety." The service bulletin further states: "Accumulated thermal cycles of the EEC with age causes the solder ball to fail."
 
On Jul 12th 2025 (India time) the AAIB released their preliminary report (currently their servers are overloaded) stating that 19 people on the ground were killed, 241 on board of the aircraft, the surviving passenger received serious injuries and continuing:
 
The thrust lever quadrant sustained significant thermal damage. Both thrust levers were found near the aft (idle) position. However, the EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained forward (takeoff thrust) until the impact. Both fuel control switch were found in the “RUN” position. (fig.13) The reverser levers were bent but were in the “stowed” position. The wiring from the TO/GA switches and autothrottle disconnect switches were visible, but heavily damaged.
 
Flaps were firmly located in the 5 degrees takeoff position. The APU inlet door was found open. The RAT (Ram Air Turbine) was deployed in the initial takeoff immediately after takeoff. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall.
 
The AIB wrote:
 
As per the EAFR data, the aircraft crossed the take-off decision speed V1 and achieved 153 kts IAS at 08:08:33 UTC. The Vr speed (155 kts) was achieved as per the EAFR at 08:08:35 UTC. The aircraft air/ground sensors transitioned to air mode, consistent with liftoff at 08:08:39 UTC.
 
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.
 
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
 
As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.
 
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC) automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
 
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11 UTC
 
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.
 
The ATCO enquired about the call sign. ATCO did not get any response but observed the aircraft crashing outside the airport boundary and activated the emergency response.
 
At 08:14:44 UTC, Crash Fire Tender left the airport premises for Rescue and firefighting. They were joined by Fire and Rescue services of Local Administration.