Quels impacts du conflit en Iran vous semblent les plus probables ?1. impact haussier de court-terme sur les cours du pétrole
2. impact haussier de long-terme sur les cours du pétrole
3. impact baissier transitoire sur la bourse (correction en V)
4. impact baissier prolongé sur la bourse (bear market)
5. pas d'impact notable en bourse (simple respiration)
6. impact inflationniste transitoire
7. impact inflationniste prolongé
8. pas d'impact notable sur l'inflation
9. mon angoisse pour mon portefeuille
10. mon indifférence (sur le plan de la bourse)
Total : 446 votes (29 votes blancs)
Sondage à 4 choix possibles.
SirConstance | Je (c) ce déterrage d'article. Un autre de 2009 assez intéressant: http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB125089367772050425 Il explique le déclin de Sears, et présente également quelques arguments du dirigeant de hedge-fund star, le nommé Serge Belinsky: "For some time after the 2005 merger of Sears and Kmart, Sears Holdings stock enjoyed a "Lampert premium" because of the hedge-fund manager's towering reputation. After all, Lampert had been christened "the next Warren Buffett" in a now-embarrassing Business Week cover story in the fall of 2004. Sears Holdings was deemed to be Lampert's Berkshire Hathaway, a vehicle he could use for further takeovers and the canny investment of excess cash." | "By 2006's second half, that thesis seemed credible. Margins were improving at the old Sears, the stock price had heft and in that year's third quarter, Lampert even scored a $101 million gain by investing excess company cash in total-return swap derivatives. That fall, Deutsche Bank analyst William Dreher called Lampert "one of the greatest investment minds of our time" and dubbed Sears "The Working Man's Hedge Fund."" | Les décisions d'allocation de capital de génie:
"A falling stock price was hardly good for marketing. Sears share buybacks hit a crescendo in the second fiscal quarter (May through July) when the company bought $1.5 billion of stock at an average price of $153.52. In the following quarter, it repurchased $888 million in shares, at an average price of $131.72." | E. Lampert le protecteur des petits porteurs (comme Christian Bale dans The Big Short):
"However, according to several hedge-fund sources, the partnership agreements also let investors cash out if the fund should slide more than 50% from its value on the date of their original investment. Many investors who'd signed up in the summer of 2007 had suffered such a loss. Yet Lampert avoided being forced to redeem their shares by having the hedge fund's investors vote on a provision to alter the partnership agreement. In the vote, his original investors used their comparatively larger interest to force the change on the newbies." | La raison évidente qui montre que SHLD ne vaut rien sans le retail (et que le real estate n'est pas si évident à monétiser) - cette partie a été volontairement censurée des articles IF bien sûr:
"Sears, for example, couldn't dump all its 250 million square feet of retail space without destroying the values of retailing properties for years to come. And the Kenmore, DieHard and Craftsman brands (but not Land's End) are so closely identified with Sears that it's difficult to ascribe much value to them if they are offered independent of Sears." | Et finalement, la conclusion enfonce le clou, pleine de bon sens paysan:
"Sears and Kmart were poorly run for years before Lampert came on the scene. Perhaps the hedge-fund chief should've heeded the famous adage of his hero, Warren Buffett: "When a management team with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it's the reputation of the business that remains intact." But that assumes that Lampert is as brilliant as he thinks he is." |
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