Gedemon a écrit :
Une source un peu sérieuse qui contredirait tout ça par exemple:
https://www.japcc.org/essays/challe [...] periority/
Citation :
Observing the conduct of the Russo-Ukraine war, it has become evident that the notion of air superiority, a cornerstone of Western military strategy, is no longer achieved by fielding a better air force. Just as the advent of aircraft revolutionized warfare a century ago, emerging technical and tactical advancements are dramatically reshaping the battlefield. This transformation underscores the necessity for a nuanced understanding of layered air superiority, encompassing everything from drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to space-based assets and cyber capabilities.
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Citation :
A critical lesson from recent conflicts is: ‘Quantity has a Quality all of its own.’7 The sheer volume of drones and inexpensive ballistic missiles can overwhelm even the most sophisticated high-tech air defence systems. This principle has been vividly demonstrated in various theatres of conflict, where mass-produced, cost-effective aerial threats have posed significant challenges to well-equipped militaries. The ability to field large numbers of drones and missiles at a fraction of the cost of advanced aircraft or complex missile systems shifts the strategic balance, compelling military planners to consider qualitative and quantitative factors in their defence strategies.
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https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/ [...] y_2025.pdf
Citation :
Air superiority, understood as control of the air, is a cornerstone of the Western art of warfare. It is a decisive condition, albeit not sufficient by itself, to achieve military victory, as it enables the concentration of air power toward the achievement of wider strategic objectives and protects other components from unbearable attrition levels. It is best achieved through the offensive use of air power in a joint effort to neutralize the enemy’s air power.
The recent developments of Russian and Chinese air power challenge the West’s ability to acquire air superiority, particularly in the field of integrated air defense systems. The proliferation of ballistic and hypersonic technologies, drones, access to advanced electronic warfare technology, and the emerging exploitation of very high altitudes are potential game changers that might bypass or undermine the traditional Western paradigm of air dominance.
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https://warontherocks.com/2024/09/w [...] ture-wars/
Citation :
In Western military thinking, air superiority has long been considered the key to victory. However, achieving complete dominance of the skies not only comes with excessively high costs but is also unrealistic, especially in a near-peer fight. It’s time to reconsider this assumption and focus on building an air force that can support the fight even when the skies are contested. As two Finnish air defense officers, we are more closely acquainted with this than most, sharing as we do a 1,300-kilometer-long border with Russia.
The argument presented in this article may be new to some but is also in the process of being developed by American and allied airpower thinkers. Gen. David W. Allvin, the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, has recently expressed similar views, notably on the War on the Rocks podcast earlier this year. Addressing air superiority, he remarked, “We need to understand that it can no longer be ubiquitous air supremacy for days and weeks on end. It has to be synchronized for the time and space and region of our choosing.” We believe this perspective is worth reiterating, as it does not yet seem to be widely embraced among air warfare professionals.
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https://luftled.info/why-russias-wa [...] air-power/
Citation :
On both sides extensive Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities in the form of high numbers of SAM and EW systems had a strategic impact on the evolution of the war, downing missiles, drones, helicopters and 4th generation fighters, while drones and artillery wreaked havoc among land forces, precluding attacks with massed armored formation. Defence is stronger than offense, provided sufficient numbers of systems and ammunition is available and high levels of attrition can be absorbed. This portends a break with the recent Western military experience in which the offence had become dominant due to tactical, operational and technological superiority, in particular in the air domain, and land forces could as a result operate swiftly with relative low levels of attrition. Presently a quick Russian incursion a few kilometers across a Baltic border would create a highly problematic fait-accompli situation for NATO. Russia could subsequently rely on its ability to sustain a subsequent attritional war longer than the West, whose capabilities will quickly be exhausted. The new Forward Presence strategy should prevent such a scenario.
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Sans les US on est mal:
https://static.rusi.org/nato-air-mi [...] sation.pdf
Citation :
Air superiority is a necessity if European states are to rapidly demonstrate the capability to quickly repulse Russian conventional aggression. Without air superiority, NATO’s European powers lack the recruitment capacity, munitions manufacturing capacity and defence funding to field the scale and quality of high-readiness ground forces and land-based firepower needed to rapidly and definitively repulse a determined Russian attack.
Land power is vital, of course, and heavy manoeuvre forces – such as those being built up by Poland, Finland and Germany – are essential to deterrence. However, such forces are still dependent on the ISTAR overwatch and massive firepower that air superiority enables for sustainable effectiveness against larger, battle-hardened Russian forces which possess far more ground-based firepower. This is especially the case for forward-deployed forces since, as the potential aggressor, Russia can
mass forces at a point and time of its choosing, whereas NATO has committed to defending ‘every inch of Alliance territory’.
Thus, to avoid being left seriously vulnerable when or if US rapid reinforcement is unlikely, European air forces must be able to achieve and exploit air superiority in a contested area. This requires the capacity to locate, suppress and then destroy the Russian surfaceto-air missile (SAM) systems that currently would make air superiority over contested Alliance territory impossible to achieve without a major US suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) campaign, while also
keeping the fighters and long-range missile-carrying bombers of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) at bay.
Currently, few European air forces have the stockpiles of specialised weapons needed, nor dedicate the focused aircrew training time required, to field highend SEAD/DEAD capabilities. As a result, NATO’s practical SEAD/DEAD capabilities against Russia in a direct conflict are heavily dependent on the US Air Force and the US Navy’s Carrier Air Wings.
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Après c'est évident que si la Russie galère contre l'Ukraine pour la supériorité aérienne, elle ne l'aura jamais contre l'OTAN.
Mais ça ne veut pas dire que les avions de l'OTAN se baladeront pépère sur la ligne de front, le danger ce n'est pas que l'aviation adverse, et ça ne veut pas dire non plus que l'OTAN serait capable d’empêcher des frappes en profondeur sur son territoire.
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