Jerry Nadler, the Democratic Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, will be issuing a subpoena for the full, unredacted Mueller report.

This was President Trump’s initial response when he heard about special counsel Robert Mueller’s appointment in May 2017:  

If there’s no collusion and no obstruction, why so many lies?
 
Vol II, Page 77: The President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the press and the public for Comey’s termination … The initial reliance on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence does not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both.
 
One of the biggest questions of the past two years — something that fueled the news coverage, the federal investigation and congressional scrutiny — is why so many people around Mr. Trump lied, misled and changed their stories. People hoping that Mr. Mueller would resolve those questions will be disappointed. Time and again, Mr. Mueller seems as confused as anyone else about the motives.

Nailed this. Here's what Barr cut off: "ALTHOUGH the investigation established ... that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts." Seems relevant.

The Guardian’s Ed Pilkington spotted this important passage as he fastidiously pours over the 448-page document.
 
Mueller lays out clear evidence that Trump attempted to lean on a couple of key witnesses to deflect the Russia inquiry away from him. The first was Paul Manafort.
 
Mueller recounts how Trump essentially dangled the promise of a pardon in front of his former campaign manager. “The president made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort, while also making it clear that the president did not want Manafort to ‘flip’.”
 
The report concludes that “with respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the president’s actions had the potential to influence Manafort’s decision whether to cooperate with the government.”
 
The second key witness was former White House counsel Don McGahn. Not only did Trump order McGahn to fire Mueller himself at a time when the Russia investigation was generating heat, but when the story of that order leaked to the press he ordered McGahn to lie and deny it.
 
Here’s the killer quote: “Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute that he was ordered to have the special counsel terminated, the president acted for the purpose of influencing McGahn’s account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the president’s conduct toward the investigation.”

In both these cases, Mueller is making a crystal clear case of witness tampering. As he explains in other parts of his report, he decided not to recommend charges on these or any other counts, not because – as the attorney general Bill Barr later ruled – there was insufficient evidence.
 
On the contrary, Mueller says there is plenty of evidence. But he is leaving the dilemma of what to do with it up to Congress.

Mueller’s report, however, is darker and more ambiguous. Mueller’s team found “multiple acts by the president that were capable of exerting undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction investigations.” And in many cases, Trump was kept out of further legal hot water by his staff’s unwillingness to carry out his directives, such as when his White House counsel refused to fire Mueller. Mueller pointedly wrote in the introduction to the section of the report dealing with obstruction that the report did not “exonerate” Trump. Mueller also wrote that he didn’t try to come to a conclusion about the president’s innocence or guilt because of a longstanding Justice Department policy that prevents a sitting president from being charged and put on trial — which he saw himself as bound by.

Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-of- justice cases.[...]. Second, unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of the President's intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct.

Jake Sherman @JakeSherman
 
NEW.. PELOSI announces Monday conference call in letter to democrats and says this:

First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate the President’s constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues. Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President’s Article II authority, which raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section III.B, infra. A factual analysis of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President’s acts were facially lawful and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses.

Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), or that he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. See United States v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction sentencing guideline, that “obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime”). Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area, or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong.

In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range of other possible personal motives animating the President’s conduct. These include concerns that continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential uncertainty about whether certain events—such as advance notice of WikiLeaks’s release of hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians—could be seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family.

Third, many of the President’s acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public view. While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a corrupt intent, the President’s power to influence actions, persons, and events is enhanced by his unique ability to attract attention through use of mass communications. And no principle of law excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system’s integrity is equally threatened.

First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that “the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions” in violation of the constitutional separation of powers.” Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28 U.S.C. § 515; 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC’s legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC’s constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President’s capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct.  
 
Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted, it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President’s term is permissible. The OLC opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office. And if individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at this time. Given those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest insafeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary materials were available.
 
Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes. The threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person’s conduct “constitutes a federal offense.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. In contrast, a prosecutor’s judgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought, affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator.  
 
The concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case of a sitting President, where a federal prosecutor’s accusation of a crime, even in an internal report, could carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar concerns about sealed indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the President’s term, OLC reasoned, “it would be very difficult to preserve [an indictment’s] secrecy,” and if an indictment became public, “[t]he stigma and opprobrium” could imperil the President’s ability to govern.”  Although a prosecutor’s internal report would not represent a formal public accusation akin to an indictment, the possibility of the report’s public disclosure and the absence of a neutral adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining that the person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense.” Justice Manual & 9-27.220.
 
Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.